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Jay E. Grenig is professor of law
at Marquette UniversityLaw
School, 1103 West Wisconsin
Avenue, Milwaukee, WI 53233;
(414) 288-5377.

Harvey Garlotte was sentenced to a three-year
prison term on a marijuana conviction. At the
same time, he was sentenced to two life terms
on two murder convictions. After serving the
sentence on the marijuana conviction and while
serving the sentences on
the murder convictions,
Garlotte filed a federal
habeas corpus petition

;

challenging the marijuana
conviction on the ground
that its sentence had
delayed his parole date on
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One of the most controversial issues
in the relationship between federal
courts and the states is federal
habeas corpus relief for state prisoners. (If such relief is granted, the
petitioner is either released from
state custody outright or is conditionally released with the state
having the option of retrying the
petitioner.) While some see the writ
of habeas corpus as an essential
protection of federal constitutional
rights, others see it as a source of
direct confrontation between
federal and state courts. The issues
surrounding federal habeas corpus
relief raise fundamental questions
about federalism, separation of
powers, the purposes of the criminal
justice system, and the nature of
criminal-law litigation.

the murder convictions.
Now the Supreme Court

FACTS
In 1985 Harvey Garlotte pleaded
guilty to one count of possession of
marijuana with intent to deliver and
was sentenced to three years'
imprisonment. On the same day he
pleaded guilty to two counts of murder and received two life sentences,
which the court ordered to run concurrently. However, the trial court
also ordered that the concurrent life
sentences were to run "consecutive,
and after" the three-year sentence
on the marijuana conviction.
Garlotte did not appeal his marijuana conviction and his two state-law
motions for post-conviction relief
were denied.
Garlotte then filed a petition for
habeas corpus relief in 1989 in the
United States District Court for the
Southern District of Mississippi,
challenging the 1985 marijuana conviction. He named as the defendant,
Kirk Fordice, Governor of the State
of Mississippi. Fordice responded by
filing a motion to dismiss the petition for failure to exhaust state-law
habeas remedies. Ultimately, the district court determined that even if

ISSUE

decides if Garlotte was in

Was a prison inmate serving consecutive sentences for possession of marijuana with intent to deliver and two
murders in custody when, after completing his sentence on the marijuana
conviction, he filed a federal habeas
corpus petition challenging the marijuana conviction on the ground that
the release date on the murder convictions had been delayed because of
the marijuana conviction?

custody at the time he
filed his habeas petition.

;
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Garlotte had failed to exhaust his
state-law remedies, such an effort
would be futile and proceeded to dismiss Garlotte's petition as meritless.
When Garlotte appealed to the Fifth
Circuit, Fordice argued that his
habeas petition should be dismissed
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction; specifically, Fordice argued that
Garlotte was not in custody for purposes of challenging his marijuana
conviction within the meaning of the
federal habeas corpus statutes. 28
U.S.C. §§ 2241 and 2254 (1988).
Agreeing with Fordice that Garlotte
was not in custody for purposes of
subject matter jurisdiction because
he was attempting to challenge a
sentence that had fully expired, the
Fifth Circuit affirmed the district
court's dismissal of his petition.
29 F.3d 216 (5th Cir. 1994).
Garlotte, proceeding pro se (that is,
representing himself), prepared and
filed a petition for a writ of certiorari
with the Supreme Court seeking
review of the Fifth Circuit's decision.
Although the Court does not often
accept pro se petitions for writs
of certiorari, the Court granted
Garlotte's petition. 115 S. Ct. 929
(1995).
CASE ANALYSIS
The federal writ of habeas corpus
has been referred to as the Great
Writ. It protects individuals against
arbitrary and wrongful imprisonment by the states. Under federal
law, a person claiming to be held in
custody by a state in violation of the
Constitution, treaties, or laws of the
United States may seek a writ of
habeas corpus from a federal court.
As noted above, if the writ is granted, the federal court orders the state
prisoner unconditionally released or
released subject to the state's right
to retry the petitioner. One study
has found that the writ is granted in,
at most, four percent of the cases in
which it is sought.

Federal law requires the person petitioning for a writ of habeas corpus to
be in custody. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241 and
2254. Seventy-five years ago the
Supreme Court interpreted the in
custody language as requiring
imprisonment; physical restraint
was a prerequisite for habeas corpus.
More recent decisions have held that
an individual may use a federal
habeas petition to challenge any
restriction of liberty.
In Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U.S. 54
(1968), the Supreme Court held that
a prisoner serving consecutive sentences is in custody under any one
of the sentences. The prisoner in
Peyton thus was able to attack a conviction, the sentence for which he
had not yet begun to serve. Garlotte's
I situation is just the reverse; he seeks
to attack a conviction, the sentence
for which has been fully served,
where a successful attack on the first
conviction would shorten the time
remaining for him to serve on the
sentences he is currently serving.
The Supreme Court later considered
whether or not federal habeas
corpus could be used to challenge
past confinements. Maleng v. Cook,
490 U.S. 488 (1989). In that case,
the habeas petitioner, Cook, had
been paroled from his initial 1958
state-law sentence when he committed other crimes resulting in a second sentence, also under state law.
While a prisoner the second time,
Cook filed a federal habeas petition
challenging the validity of his 1958
conviction and alleging that the
1958 conviction had been used illegally to enhance the sentence
imposed on his later-committed
crimes.
The Maleng Court emphasized that
it had never held that a federal
habeas petitioner is in custody
under a conviction when the sentence imposed for that conviction
has fully expired at the time the

petition is filed. The Court suggested that once the sentence imposed
for a conviction has completely
expired, the collateral, i.e., indirect,
consequences of that conviction are
not sufficient to render an individual in custody for the purposes of a
federal habeas attack on it.
Pointing out that almost all states
have habitual offender statutes and
that many states provide for specific enhancement of subsequent sentences on the basis of prior convictions, the Maleng Court said that
the in custody requirement would
be read out of the statute if a petitioner whose sentence has completely expired is permitted to use
the federal habeas statute to mount
a latter-day challenge on the conviction underlying the expired
sentence. However, the Court went
on to say that because Cook was in
custody under the second sentence, he satisfied the in custody
requirement and could challenge
the sentence for which he was
currently in custody as enhanced
by the allegedly invalid prior conviction. The Court warned that it
was expressing no view on the
extent to which Cook's 1958 conviction itself could be challenged in
the attack on the later sentences
which it was used to enhance.
The Fifth Circuit's decision being
reviewed in this case conflicts with
the decisions of other courts of
appeals on the same issue. In Fox v.
Kelso, 911 F.2d 563 (11th Cir.
1990), the Eleventh Circuit held
that it had jurisdiction to review
prior convictions although the federal habeas petition was filed after
the sentences had been served,
where the served sentences
delayed the date from which the
inmate would receive credit for
time served against convictions
under which he was currently
imprisoned.
(Continued on Page 342)
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In Harrisonv. Indiana, 597 F.2d
115 (7th Cir. 1979), the Seventh
Circuit held that a federal court had
jurisdiction over a federal habeas
petition brought by a state prisoner
to challenge a conviction for which
he had fully served the sentence,
where the earlier conviction delayed
the start of his current imprisonment and would delay his release.
The court stressed that, whichever
conviction he attacked, his petition
was filed while he was in custody.
The Seventh Circuit reached a
similar conclusion in Fawcett v.
Bablitch, 962 F.2d 617 (7th Cir.
1992). In that case, the petitioner
was not in custody on the first
conviction for sexual contact with a
minor when he filed his federal
habeas petition. However, he was on
probation for a second conviction for
a similar offense at the time the petition was filed. Noting that probation
is a form of custody, the court
concluded that a person serving a
sentence that has been enhanced
because of a prior conviction may
challenge the validity of that conviction by way of federal habeas corpus.
Likewise, in Bernard v. Garraghty,
934 F.2d 52 (4th Cir. 1991), the
Fourth Circuit held that a prisoner
serving the second of two consecutive state sentences is in custody for
purposes of bringing a federal habeas
corpus challenge to the first, already
served sentence. The court held that
Peyton, not Maleng, was the controlling Supreme Court precedent.
According to the Fourth Circuit,
under Peyton, custody of a prisoner
serving consecutive sentences is
defined not by any one particular
sentence but by the aggregate of the
sentences. The court pointed out
that in Maleng the Supreme Court
did not address consecutive sentences or attempt to define when the
first sentence is discharged.
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The Eighth Circuit, on the other
hand, reached a similar conclusion
as was reached by the Fifth Circuit
in this case. In Allen v. Dowd, 964
F.2d 745 (8th Cir. 1992), the Eighth
Circuit determined that an offender
serving consecutive sentences is not
in custody on the first of those
sentences if the first sentence has
technically expired. The court, however, observed that the prisoner was
entitled to a new petition attacking
the conviction for which he was
then in custody.
SIGNIFICANCE
The expansion of the federal
constitutional rights of criminal
defendants following World War II
also resulted in a dramatic expansion of the scope of federal habeas
corpus relief. However, in recent
years, the Supreme Court has
imposed substantial new obstacles
to habeas relief. The Rehnquist
Court has repeatedly emphasized
the costs of federal habeas relief in
disrupting the finality of convictions
and causing friction between federal
and state courts. The Court's decision in this case will indicate
whether the Court will continue to
restrain the use of the Great Writ.
ARGUMENTS
For Harvey F. Garlotte (Counsel of
Record: Brian D. Boyle; O'Melveny
& Myers; 555 13th Street, NW, Suite
500 West, Washington, DC;
(202) 383-5300):
1. Consecutive sentences must be
aggregated for purposes of the in
custody requirement of the federal
habeas corpus statutes.
2. Maleng v. Cook forecloses federal
habeas corpus jurisdiction only with
respect to convictions that no longer
impose any present restraints on the
habeas corpus petitioner.

For Kirk Fordice, Governor of the
State of Mississippi (Counsel of
Record: Marvin L. White, Jr., Special
Assistant Attorney General of the
State of Mississippi; P.O. Box
220, Jackson, MS 39205;
(601) 359-3680):
1. Dismissal of the petition for a writ
of habeas corpus was proper because
Garlotte no longer met the in
custody requirement at the time the
petition was filed.
2. Because Garlotte's parole delay
merely constitutes a collateral consequence of his marijuana conviction, he has failed to allege a positive
and demonstrable connection
between the marijuana conviction
and the murder sentences he is now
serving.

AMIcus BRIEFS
In support of Harvey F. Garlotte
Joint brief of the Post-Conviction
Assistance Project of the University
of Virginia and the National Legal
Aid and Defender Association
(Counsel of Record: Harold J. Krent;
Chicago-Kent College of Law; 565
West Adams Street, Chicago, IL
60661; (312) 906-5397).
In support of Kirk Fordice,
Governor of the State of Mississippi
Criminal Justice Legal
Foundation (Counsel of Record:
Kent S. Scheidegger; Criminal
Justice Legal Foundation; 2131 L
Street, Sacramento, CA 95816;
(916) 446-0345).
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